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John Maynard Keynes, the influential economist of the Twentieth Century, 
envisioned the day when society would focus on ends (well-being) rather 
than on means such as economic growth. In his Essays in Persuasion 
(Keynes, 1930, p. 365), he writes: “We shall once more value ends above 
means and prefer the good to the useful.”  
Similarly, the contemporary economist and philosopher Amartya Sen, who 
was awarded the Nobel Prize of Economics in 1998 for his significant 
contributions to welfare economics, has persistently argued for shifting 
attention from means to ends. According to Sen’s justly celebrated 
Capability Approach (hereafter CA), which is the subject of this paper, 
social evaluation should be based on the life that people have reason to 
value, rather than measures that are only instrumental to human advantage.  
His core argument has been that traditional theories of the social good fail 
to assess human well-being adequately because of their too narrow 
informational base. According to the definition of Sen (1990, p. 111), the 
informational base of any social evaluative exercise “identifies the 
information on which the judgment is directly dependent and – no less 
important – asserts that the truth or falsehood of any other type of 
information cannot directly influence the correctness of the judgment”. 
Thus, the informational base entails both informational inclusion—
considering the information that is regarded as important within the 
respective theoretical framework—and  informational exclusion—
disregarding any information which is not supposed to have any direct 
influence on the evaluative judgment (Sen, 1999, p. 56). For instance, 
utilitarianism exclusively relies on utility information, thus ignoring non-
utility information such as the treatment of rights and liberties.   
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Sen contends that human advantage comprises many dimensions which 
cannot possibly be captured by one single variable. The security of rights 
and liberties must be taken into consideration as much as happiness, 
resources or other aspects one has reason to value. This pluralism imposes 
high requirements on any theoretical foundation. In fact, Sen dedicated 
much of his academic life to the pursuit of a sufficiently broad 
informational base which would provide an adequate evaluative space for 
the analysis of well-being (Sugden, 1993, p. 1947). Sen’s critique of 
traditional approaches was both forceful and critical to helping him form 
his own theoretical framework.  
Starting his career as a social choice theorist, Sen quickly showed interest 
in moving beyond the nihilistic foundations of standard welfare economics. 
He was particularly concerned with questions of economic inequality and 
the treatment of rights. In his lecture, entitled “Equality of What?” and 
delivered at the Tanner Lectures on Human Values at Stanford University 
in May 1979 (1980), he introduced the primordial concept of “basic 
capability equality” as an alternative approach to social evaluation. He 
claimed that human advantage should not be judged in terms of utility, 
rights or resources but in terms of basic capabilities—the ability to “do 
certain basic things”. In subsequent years Sen advanced this framework in 
a number of contexts, especially in his 1984 Dewey Lectures (1985) and in 
his monograph, Commodities and Capabilities (2010)
1. This led to the 
establishment of the CA.  
                                                       
1 Sen’s work, Commodities and Capabilities, is based on his Hennipman Lecture 
delivered at the University of Amsterdam in April 1982. The monograph was first 
published in North-Holland, 1985. Here reference is, however, made to the 14
th Oxford 
India edition published in 2010.  
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The CA represents “a conception of an individual’s good which does not 
automatically assert that whatever the individual chooses is good for him 
[in terms of material well-being]” (Sugden, 1993, p. 1951). The assumption 
that agents also pursue goals other than well-being is captured by the two 
interdependent dimensions of well-being and agency freedom, which are 
central to the CA. We argue that though this distinction had not been 
clearly articulated until the Dewey Lectures (1985), Sen’s concern with 
both aspects can be traced back to his earlier writings on the tension 
between Paretian economics and libertarianism.  
Our primary objective is to describe this evolutionary process in a non-
technical way, starting with his ingenious work, Collective Choice and 
Social Welfare (1970) through to Development as Freedom (1999a). The 
paper is structured as follows: Section two is devoted to Sen’s concern with 
developing an alternative theory of the social good. The need for the 
advancement of a new theoretical framework is conditional on concluding 
the limited usefulness of conventional approaches. Therefore we will 
outline Sen’s appraisal of classical utilitarianism established by Bentham 
(1789), subsequently emerging Paretianism, libertarianism as well as 
Rawls’ conception of primary social goods. Next, we will present Sen’s 
alternative foundation and highlight its relative advantages. The process of 
investigating traditional conceptions of the social good and making a first 
tentative approach to the establishment of an alternative theoretical 
framework roughly spans the period from 1970 until 1980.
2 Section three 
constitutes the core of our analysis. Here we describe the development of 
                                                       
2 In my analysis I shall refer to Sen’s following works: Collective Choice and Social 
Welfare (1970); “Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What’s Wrong with 
Welfare Economics?” (1979a); “Utilitarianism and Welfarism” (1979b); “Equality of 
What?” (1980) and On Economic Inequality (1997) (This work was first published in 
1973. Here, however, reference is made to the 1997 expanded edition).   
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the CA in reference to selected works of Amartya Sen.
3 We shall draw 
special attention to the following questions: What are the key 
characteristics of this innovative approach? How does it differ from 
traditional approaches? What implications does it entail? Were there any 
adjustments in the course of time? In the fourth section we turn to the 
major flaw of the CA: its empirical application. We shall, however, argue 
that past empirical shortcomings should not cause us to underestimate the 
significance of Sen’s work and its impact on the development paradigm. 
Finally, section five provides concluding remarks.  
2  Struggling for an Informational Base 
In this section we shall describe Sen’s long-term quest for an informational 
base on which he could build a more constructive welfare economics.  
2.1  Moving beyond Utilitarianism  
The founder of classical utilitarianism, Jeremy Bentham, explains in his 
famous work, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
(1789 (1982, pp. 11-16)), that since “nature has placed mankind under the 
governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure,” it is the principle 
of utility “which approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, 
according to the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish 
the happiness of the party whose interest is in question.” Utility is gained 
through the possession of objects which tend to “produce benefit, 
                                                       
3 I shall make reference to: “Equality of What?” (1980); “Rights and Agency” (1982); 
“Goods and People” (1984a); “Rights and Capabilities” (1984b); “Well-being, Agency 
and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984” (1985); “The Standard of Living” (1987a); 
Inequality Reexamined (1992); “Capability and Well-being” (1993); Development as 
Freedom (1999a) and Commodities and Capabilities (2010).  
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advantage, pleasure, good and happiness or prevent the happening of 
mischief, pain, evil or unhappiness.”
4  
From this notion two implications can be derived. First, it is important to 
differentiate between the means to obtain utility and utility itself. Having a 
high income, for instance, may be conducive to happiness or pleasure (and 
thus to utility), but it is not the object of value itself (Sen, 1987a, pp. 4-5). 
Second, all choices must be judged by their expected results. The results 
again are judged by the utilities they generate. The process through which 
certain outcomes are accomplished is not taken into consideration as 
utilitarianism, a teleological theory, defines the good (utilities) 
independently from the right, and then the right is defined as what 
maximizes the good (Rawls, 1971, p. 24). Consequentialism (all choices 
must be judged by their outcomes) and welfarism (any outcome is to be 
judged in terms of utility) represent two of three requirements of classical 
utilitarian evaluation.  
In his work, Bentham generally distinguishes between two entities: The 
individual and the community. The community comprises individuals and 
the interest of the community is thus best served when the sum total of the 
interests of the individuals is maximized. Sum-ranking, the aggregation of 
individual utilities, makes up for the third component of utilitarian 
evaluation.   
From this theoretical approach, the traditional welfare economics 
discipline—a branch of microeconomic theory advocated by Marshall, 
Sidgwick, Edgeworth and Pigou—emerged.  
                                                       
4 In his writings Sen assumes that utility captures happiness, pleasure or desire-
fulfillment. In modern welfare economics, utility is also defined as the numerical 
representation of one’s choice.   
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The practical implications of this approach can be best exemplified when 
applied to the distribution of a sum of money among various persons. Each 
person’s utility is a positive, concave function of his respective share of the 
sum. The function has a concave shape because every additional quantity 
of money will yield smaller and smaller increases in utility. The 
individuals’ utilities are cardinal—that is, scale-measurable by observation 
or judgment. The utilitarian objective—maximization of total utility—
demands equalization of marginal utilities. This is considered the most 
efficient state of affairs, in the sense that no possible allocation would 
increase the sum total of the individuals’ utilities. That is, total utility 
cannot be raised by transferring money from one person to another. 
Equality in the utilitarian sense means that everyone’s interest is valued 
equally. This egalitarian impression is deceptive. The notion that an equal 
distribution of some good will yield the greatest sum total of utilities 
applies only if every individual has the same utility function (and thus 
identical marginal utilities), that is, everyone shows the same tastes and the 
same capacity for satisfaction (Little, 2002, p. 11).  
However, it seems more reasonable to assume that human beings genuinely 
differ in their preferences and their capacity to reach content. While some 
may settle with little, others need more to attain the same level of 
satisfaction.
5 In this context, Sen (1997) considers two persons—one 
crippled and the other, able-bodied. The handicapped person is relatively 
inefficient in converting income into utility. Sum-ranking would therefore 
demand redistribution of income from the handicapped person to the 
                                                       




6 Thus, when the assumption that everyone has an 
identical capacity of satisfaction is dropped, the utilitarian approach 
becomes insensitive to the distribution of individual utilities as “even the 
minutest gain in total utility sum would be taken to outweigh distributional 
inequalities of the most blatant kind” (Sen, 1980, p. 202). One may be 
tempted to argue that replacing sum-ranking by another constraint will 
resolve distributional issues. His Weak Equity Axiom (Sen, 1997, pp. 18-
22) is, in this context, to be seen as an attempt to do just that. It balances 
inequality by allowing for distributions in favor of the indigent person with 
a marginal utility disadvantage. However, the scope of the approach seems 
to be limited because its mild conditions do not specify how much more 
income, goods, etc., should be given to the relatively worse-off to increase 
his or her welfare. Even the smallest distributional gain for the 
disadvantaged would thus satisfy the axiom.
7  
As we move on, we will observe that it is not the constraint of sum-ranking 
alone that makes utility-based teleological approaches unsuited to the 
analysis of the social good.  
2.2  Moving beyond Welfarism  
In order to maximize total utility, individual utilities have to be scale-
measureable and interpersonally comparable. This condition, upon which 
the consistency of utilitarianism in the classical sense rests, has been called 
into question by Robbins (1935). He argues that “there is no means of 
testing the magnitude of A’s satisfaction as compared with B’s” and thus, 
“no way of comparing the satisfaction of different people” (ibid., pp. 139-
                                                       
6 Sen (1980, pp. 203-204) explains that this applies to people with a marginal utility 
disadvantage in general. In fact, a crippled person does not necessarily have to suffer 
from a marginal utility disadvantage.  
7 For further discussion of the Weak Equity Axiom, see Sen (1997, pp. 18-22).  
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140). Garis (2007, p. 15) says that “such things like utility are only partly 
revealed to the person himself; how much more hidden from others must 
they be.” Robbins’ seminal work had a powerful impact on the field of 
economic science. His criticism was conducive to the development of the 
New Welfare Economics discipline, which is based on the view that only 
ordinal preferences and not cardinality may be applicable to satisfaction, 
thus ruling out sum-ranking. In his Ethics and Economics (1987b, p. 38), 
Sen concludes:  
“If interpersonal comparisons of utility are dropped, but 
nevertheless utility is regarded as the only thing of intrinsic value, 
then Pareto optimality would be the natural surviving criterion, 
since it carries the utilitarian logic as far forward as possible 
without actually making any interpersonal comparisons of utility.“
8 
The concept of Pareto optimality describes a state in which no individual 
can be made better off without adversely affecting someone else. The 
Pareto principle avoids any distributional issues because a situation in 
which one person owns everything while the other one is left with nothing 
would still be considered Pareto-efficient—despite its apparent disparity—
since redistribution from the rich to the poor would make the rich person 
worse off. Admittedly, one Pareto-optimum may be intuitively regarded 
better or more just than another, but the framework itself does not provide 
any foundation on which such judgment can be made. We may suppose 
that in the case of a vast income disparity between two persons, the rich’s 
marginal utility is relatively low (thus making shifts of goods to the poor 
worthwhile), but the very fact that it is only suspected and not grounded on 
numerical information disallows for such judgments (Sen, 1979a, p. 336). 
                                                       
8 For further discussion, see Sen (1970, Theorem 5.3).   
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In this context, Sen rightly points out that “a society or an economy can be 
Pareto-optimal and still be perfectly disgusting” (Sen, 1970, p.22). 
Kenneth J. Arrow pioneer of social choice theory, which is typically 
concerned with the relation between the objectives of social policy and the 
preferences and aspirations of the members of society, adopted the 
foundations of New Welfare Economics, to wit ordinalism and 
incomparable utilities. In his seminal work Social Choice and Individual 
Values (1951), Arrow showed that a set of mild-looking and ethically 
essential conditions rules out the possibility of arriving at a social welfare 
function—an ordering of the ordinally described personal utility levels 
attained by each of the individual members of the society in question.
9  
Sen was deeply impressed by the implications of Arrow’s famous 
“Impossibility Theorem” and motivated by a desire to overcome this 
pessimistic picture by going beyond the limited informational base of his 
approach (1999b). In Collective Choice and Social Welfare (1970), Sen 
presents a survey of social choice theory and shows that the impossibility 
results can be resolved if the narrow informational constraint imposed by 
incomparable utility measures is abandoned. Sen (1970, Theorem 8*2) 
shows, for example, that cardinalism does little on its own if it is not 
accompanied by interpersonal comparability. In his appraisal of Sen’s 
                                                       
9 Sen (1970, pp. 37-38) informally presents the four conditions Arrow (1951) imposes 
on his theorem. First, the social welfare function must work for every logically possible 
configuration of individual preference orderings. Second, the function must satisfy the 
weak Pareto principle, that is, if everyone prefers x to y, then so does society. Third, the 
theorem requires that social choice over a set of social states is restricted to the 
orderings of the individuals only over those states, thus ignoring irrelevant alternatives. 
Fourth, whenever an individual prefers x to y, society does not have to conform to this. 




contributions to the study of social welfare, Arrow (1999, p. 166) points out 
that “for any degree of interpersonal comparability, the invariance 
requirements on the social welfare function are correspondingly lightened, 
and the possibility of finding an acceptable social choice procedure 
increased”.   
Remarkably, Sen (1970) has initiated the discussion of the impossibility of 
a Paretian liberal. He has objected the idea that utility measures are the 
only determinants of the social choice exercise. From an ethical 
perspective—so his claim—people should also have the possibility to make 
private choices independent of the generated utilities. In his Theorems 6.1; 
6.2 and 6.3, he proves that even the weak Pareto-principle may conflict 
with a minimum demand of personal liberties and rights. But “both the 
Pareto judgment and the idea that each individual has some private domain 
of choice, even if others would make different choices over that domain, 
are hard to deny” (Arrow, 1999, p. 165).  
The interesting point here is that the impossibility arises from the 
underlying motivation of the utility measures. In the mentioned theorems 
Sen shows that the negative results could be turned into positive ones if the 
persons involved did not get utility out of the discomfiture and sufferings 
of others. But utility is utility—independent of its nature. The underlying 
motivation as non-utility information is therefore not permitted to make a 
difference in the assessment of social states of affairs. As it turns out, the 
main issue is really the informational constraint imposed by welfarism, 
which rules out any information other than utility.  
In later writings Sen moves on to demonstrate that the inadequacy of 
welfarism is not limited to ordinalism but is sustained even when the 
informational base is broadened to the inclusion of cardinal utility 
measures. In his “Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What’s  
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Wrong with Welfare Economics?” (1979a, pp. 339-341), he considers two 
pairs (x, y) and (a, b) of circumstances which are identical in utility levels 
and only differ in non-utility information. The informational constraint of 
welfarism would require to rank x vis-à-vis y in the same way as a vis-à-vis 
b, irrespective of non-utility information. Next, Sen considers two persons r 
(rich) and p (poor). In State x there is no redistributive taxation and r’s 
utility amounts to 10 utils while p is left with 4. In State y some money is 
transferred from the rich to the poor, thus raising the utility of the poor to 7 
and lowering utility of the rich to 8. Note that utilitarianism would rank y 
before x because only in State y will utility be maximized. The second pair 
(a, b) is identical in utility information. The only difference between (x, y) 
and (a, b) rests in non-utility descriptions. While p’s higher utility in y 
results from the money transfer, his utility increase in b stems from the 
pleasure he gains from torturing r (which obviously lowers r’s utility). 
Since welfarism rules out any information other than utility, b and y are 
socially indifferent. “[A] tortured body … is [however] as much a part of 
the state affairs as the utility and disutility occurring in that state” (Sen, 
1979b, p. 488) and should therefore be taken into account.  
This example dramatically illustrates that not even the motivation 
underlying utility measures is taken into consideration because of its non-
utility informational value (Sen, 1979a, 1979b). Whether utilities are based 
on personal joys or on the sufferings of others does not matter. Any non-
utility information, not relevant for instrumental reasons, simply must not 
have any influence on the assessment of outcomes. Hence, Sen rightly 
points out that the inadequacy of welfarism for the judgment of social 
states of affairs becomes evident “by looking at correspondences between 
judgments in different cases that are identical on the utility space but not in 
terms of particular non-utility information” (1979b, p. 479).   
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2.3  Moving beyond Libertarianism  
Sen’s work on the Paretian liberal motivated Nozick (1974) to develop a 
philosophical approach which abandons the idea of assessing social welfare 
and emphasizes the importance of rights. In Nozick’s deontology, liberties 
are treated as constraints on action. These constraints simply must not be 
violated even if violation would make superior outcomes achievable. Thus, 
liberties have intrinsic rather than instrumental value—that is, judgment of 
actions is made independently of outcomes. If social choice is possible 
within these constraints, then it can be made according to the Pareto-
principle. Later Sen (1982, pp. 5-6) notes that utilitarianism and the 
deontological constraint-based approach share “the denial that realization 
and failure of rights should enter into the evaluation of states of affairs 
themselves and could be used for consequential analysis of actions”. It is 
this denial to which Sen is opposed. For example, constraint-based 
libertarianism would rule out the possibility of C stealing B’s car if the 
murder of A by B could be prevented because stealing B’s car is as much a 
violation of B’s right than taking A’s life. Sen, however, argues that a more 
adequate approach would consider liberties and rights in the evaluation of 
outcomes first—that is, B’s liberty deprivation (the theft of his car) would 
be compared with the violation of A’s liberty (his murder). If A’s liberty is 
prioritized to B’s liberty, then C’s action becomes justified. Taking note of 
liberties and rights in the assessment of outcomes would thus allow for the 
consideration of what Sen calls “third part moralities” (Sen, 1979a, p. 
346)—the possibility of weighing the relative “badness” of one action 
against the “badness” of the action which this violation helped to prevent.  
Hence, his contention is that an adequate informational base of a social 
good theory would need to retain consequentialism, the merit of 
teleological approaches in general and of classical utilitarianism and New  
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Welfare Economics in particular. However, it must not impose welfarism, 
which would allow for the inclusion of non-utility information such as 
liberties and rights. This realization constitutes a crucial accomplishment in 
Sen’s struggle for an informational base. Subsequent developments, such as 
the “goal rights system” introduced in “Rights and Agency” (1982), and the 
distinction between well-being and agency aspects (1985) ultimately 
originate from it. 
His particular concern with the limitation of prevalent Paretian economics 
on the one hand, and the inadequacy of libertarian consideration on the 
other, is evident in most of writings published in the 1970s. He realized that 
in order to set forth an adequate theory of the social good, the nihilistic or 
narrow informational base of these approaches would need to be extended 
to concepts such as justice, equality and freedom emphasized by traditional 
philosophical and economic approaches (Klamer, 1989, pp. 139-140). In 
his quest he sought inspiration from Rawls’ conception of primary social 
goods, discussed below.  
2.4  Moving beyond Rawlsian Justice 
Rawls’ liberal conception of primary social goods described in his 
groundbreaking book, A Theory of Justice (1971), suggests shifting focus 
from utility information to opportunities and freedoms. In “Equality of 
What?” (1980) Sen scrutinizes this concept for the first time. 
Rawls’ theory—founded on the two principles of justice which are 
arranged in a serial order—demands equality in terms of primary social 
goods. These goods comprise “things that every rational man is presumed 
to want,” such as rights, liberties, opportunities, income, wealth, power, 
authority and self-respect (1971, p. 62).   
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According to Rawls’ first principle, basic liberties are prioritized to other 
primary social goods because “each person is to have an equal right to the 
most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others” 
(ibid., p. 60). These liberties include political liberty, freedom of speech 
and assembly, liberty of conscience and freedom of thought, property rights 
and freedom from arbitrariness. Similar to Nozick’s libertarianism, these 
liberties must simply not be violated in favor of social or economic 
advantages. The reasonableness of this approach is disputable. As 
important as basic liberties such as freedom of speech and thought may be, 
Sen rightly raises the question of why the status of intense economic needs, 
which in some countries can be matters of life and death, should be lower 
than that of basic liberties (1999a, p. 64). Securing basic liberties is by far 
not redundant—quite the opposite—but ignoring economic aspects of well-
being, on the other hand, cannot be sufficiently justified. What is the point 
of being able to vote and expressing his opinion in public if scarce 
economic means cause a struggle for survival? Is the personal advantage of 
a person starving to death really increased when granted basic liberties?  
The second principle, also called the difference principle, suggests that 
divergence from the initially equal distribution of the other primary social 
goods is only permissible if mutually beneficial in a way that the advantage 
of the worst-off person is maximized. This is opposed to utilitarian ideas, 
which only demand that the advantage of one party is not to the 
disadvantage of the other.
10  
                                                       
10 Note that the difference principle is, however, still compatible with the principle of 
Pareto-efficiency. In a situation in which the interest of the least-advantaged is 
maximized, it is indeed impossible to make any one better off without disadvantaging 
the worst-off one as his expectations are already maximized. For an explicit discussion, 
see Rawls (1971, p. 79).  
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Rawls sees the good in the “satisfaction of rational desires” (1971, p. 93). 
He goes on to argue that irrespective of what his rational desires may be, 
man requires primary social goods for the execution of his plans. Goods 
such as wealth and authority—so the argument—allow agents to pursue 
goals they could not accomplish otherwise. In this way, an increasing index 
of primary social goods ameliorates man’s prospects or his advantage since 
then superior desires become attainable. When these desires are satisfied, 
the personal good will improve in consequence. As opposed to 
utilitarianism the Rawlsian approach does not judge these prospects by 
their expected utility gain; instead it is assumed that man, as a rational 
agent, should pursue his individual conception of the good as long as it is 
compatible with the principles of justice (ibid., p. 94). His focus on 
enabling people to pursue their rational desires by granting them an index 
of primary social goods demonstrates that Rawls saw social progress in fact 
in the expansion of positive freedom.
11 It is this very notion that inspired 
Sen to develop the CA.
12    
Sen is, however, at odds with Rawls’ “agreement to compare men’s 
situation solely by reference to things which it is assumed they all prefer 
more of” (Rawls, 1971, p. 95).
13 Rawls holds “primary social goods as the 
embodiment of advantage” (Sen, 1980, p. 216). But Sen argues that 
                                                       
11 There two notions of freedom in philosophy. While negative freedom describes the 
immunity from interference of others, the positive version relates to a person’s ability to 
act freely.  
12 In his autobiography found on the official website of the Nobel prize Sen states that 
his “work on social justice based on individual freedoms and capabilities was (…) 
motivated by an aspiration to learn from, but go beyond, John Rawls’ elegant theory of 
justice, through a broader use of available information” (1999b). 




primary social goods cannot be the object of value itself because the 
conversion of goods into what he calls “basic capabilities” varies with 
“health, longevity, climatic conditions, location, work conditions, 
temperament and even body size” (ibid., pp. 215-216). The term “basic 
capabilities” translates to “being able to do certain basic things,”
14 such as 
“the ability to meet one’s nutritional requirements, the wherewithal to be 
clothed and sheltered, the power to participate in the social life of the 
community” (ibid., p. 218).
15 He contends that the conception of primary 
social goods seeks to refer to capabilities but ends up focusing on goods. 
Freedom is the overall goal, but the emphasis is on means. In Inequality 
Reexamined, one of his later works, Sen (1992, p. 38) gets to the heart of 
the issue:  
“If we are interested in the freedom of choice, then we have to look 
at the choices that the person does in fact have, and we must not 
assume that the same results would be obtained by looking at the 
resources that he or she commands.”  
Thus, Sen views his theoretical framework as “an extension of the 
Rawlsian approach” (Sen, 1980, p. 219), which shifts attention from goods 
to how these goods affect the life of human beings. The shift from focusing 
on goods to focusing on capabilities is to be seen as the starting point of the 
                                                       
14 As Sen’s subsequent works make clear the term “basic capabilities” is not confined to 
what a person is able to do but refers to what a person can be as well.  
15 In his “Goods and People”, a paper presented at the International Economic 
Association in November 1983 (1984a) Sen defends his novel approach against the 
simultaneously evolving “basic needs” movement pioneered by Streeten (1981). 
Though the concept of basic capabilities and the basic needs approach share the focus 
on reaching a minimum level of capabilities such as shelter, basic education, and 
nourishment among others, the latter defines these needs in terms of commodity 
requirements only. For the full rationale, see Sen (1984a, pp. 513-515).   
 
17
evolution of the CA and builds straightforwardly on the early attempts of 
the pioneers of national accounting, Lagrange and Petty, among others, to 
assess people’s living conditions (Sen, 1987a).
16  
3  The Capability Approach  
As outlined in the introduction, the CA comprises two dimensions: the 
well-being and the agency aspect. We shall consider the evolution of the 
well-being aspect first.  
3.1 The  Well-being  Aspect  of the Capability Approach 
From a methodological point of view, it is fundamentally important to 
comprehend the change in strategy Sen engages in with the introduction of 
his primordial “basic capability equality” approach. His conclusion that 
traditional approaches to the analysis of social welfare leave issues such as 
distributional considerations and the violation of liberties and rights 
unresolved while libertarianism fails to be consequence-sensitive (Sen, 
1970, 1979a, 1979b, 1980, 1997) caused Sen to turn to the evaluation of 
well-being from the standpoint of the individual (Sugden, 1993, p. 1951). 
The following describes how Sen conclusively advances his primordial 
“basic capability equality” in writings subsequent to “Equality of What?” 
(1980).  
3.1.1  The Scope of the Capability Approach 
In “Goods and People” (1984a), Sen explains that basic capabilities are 
only a subset of all capabilities—a much broader range which includes all 
                                                       
16 Lagrange converted goods that had similar roles in consumption into equivalents of 
each other in terms of their characteristics. For example, he converted vegetal foods into 
units of wheat in terms of nourishment value.   
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precious doings and beings. Sen emphasizes at an early stage that the CA is 
not confined to the analysis of poverty only but “is applicable to judging 
advantage and deprivation in rich countries as well” (ibid., p. 514). Sen 
(2010, pp. 30-31) claims that more sophisticated capabilities such as “the 
ability to entertain friends, be close to people one would like to see, take 
part in the life of the community, etc., may vary a good deal even within 
rich countries”. Sen frequently refers to “appearing in public without 
shame” because it highlights the theoretical connection to the works of 
Adam Smith, the founder of the economic discipline, and shows that 
absolute deprivation in terms of capabilities may take the form of relative 
deprivation in income. 
3.1.2 The  Conversion  Process 
Next, Sen elucidates the conversion process from goods into capabilities. 
While Sen provides both an extensive formal and an easily comprehensible 
informal presentation of the conversion process in Commodities and 
Capabilities (2010, pp. 6-11), the description included in his “Rights and 
Capabilities” (1984b, pp. 315-317)
17 is not fully developed and entirely 
non-mathematical. With the introduction of the “conversion chain,” Sen 
also makes some change in terminology. The achievement of a person 
formerly described by the term “capabilities” is now referred to as 
“functionings”.
18 (For purposes of this paper, we shall use the term 
functionings.)  
                                                       
17 The paper draws on Sen’s James Lecture at the New York Institute for Humanities in 
November 1982 and his Boutwood Lectures at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge in 
November 1983. 
18 It is important to note that some scholars working within the capability paradigm do 
not follow this terminology and refer to functionings as capabilities. Even Sen himself 
uses the terms interchangeably. Whenever I employ the term “capabilities” I refer to the  
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Commodities—Sen argues—entail characteristics. The possession of 
commodities thus gives the owner command over the respective 
characteristics. The properties of bread, for example, allow the owner to 
satisfy hunger, yield nutrition, be pleased or be able to provide a 
contribution to social gatherings. While the characteristics of bread are 
independent of its owner, the achieved functionings—that is, what people 
actually succeed in doing—are subject to interpersonal variation. 
Appeasing one’s hunger through the consumption of bread, for instance, 
depends on gender, age, body size, metabolism and perhaps even climate. 
Similarly, bread can only provide a contribution to social conventions if 
one is member of a group or has acquaintances that he or she can meet 
with.  
For another example, consider a bicycle. It features the characteristic of 
mobility. Whether the owner of the bike will indeed achieve mobility 
depends not only on whether the person is able-bodied or not, as suggested 
by Sen (2010, p. 6), but may also vary with the person’s geographical 
location. If he or she lives in a sparsely populated area, then the distance 
between home and work or between home and a friend’s house may be too 
far to travel by bike.  
These two examples already indicate that there is a wide range of 
conversion factors, which affect the transformation of commodities into 
functionings.
19 Extrapolating from opulence—the possession of a bundle of 
                                                                                                                                                               
plural form of the terms “capability” or “capability set” which describe the various 
combinations of functionings that a person can achieve. For further discussion of this 
issue, see also Robeyns (2005, p. 100).  
19 Sen (1999a, pp. 70-71) suggests that the relation between commodities and 
functionings is governed by five categories of conversion factors: personal 
heterogeneities, environmental diversities, variations in social climate, differences in 
relational perspectives, distribution within the family. Robeyns (2005, p. 99), on the  
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commodities—to functionings is thus a non-starter because it ignores 
interpersonally varying circumstances. Especially in poverty analysis, it is 
often argued that poverty can be seen more as an inadequacy of income 
than a lack of capabilities. In his paper “Capabilities and Well-being” 
(1993, pp. 40-41), a succinct summary of the CA, Sen admits that the 
income perspective is permissible as long as income represents the only 
means to the enhancement of capabilities and takes account of 
interpersonal variability. This is interesting insofar as it implies that income 
or opulence is not the only means to an end. Formal and informal political 
and economic institutions such as political participation, the effective 
protection of property rights or cultural habits, may be seen as crucial 
inputs to the generation of capabilities as well (Robeyns, 2005, p. 96).  
3.1.3  Functionings and Utilities 
Rejecting welfarism on the ground that the exclusion of non-utility 
information may lead to untenable inferences on the aggregate level does 
not necessarily entail the limited usefulness of utility for the assessment of 
well-being on the individual level. Sen thus had to show that capabilities 
indeed capture the extent of personal well-being better than measures of 
happiness, pleasure or desire-fulfillment.  
Sen convincingly demonstrates the inadequacy of restricting the assessment 
of individual well-being to utility information in terms of happiness and 
pleasure first in “Goods and People” (1984a) and “Rights and Capabilities” 
(1984b) and then in several of his later works.  
Sen argues that measuring well-being in terms of happiness is substantially 
flawed because happiness is basically a mental state which is independent 
                                                                                                                                                               
contrary, suggests three groups of conversion factors: personal conversion factors, 
social conversion factors and environmental factors.   
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of other aspects of well-being. For instance, concluding that a destitute 
farmer enjoys a high level of well-being because his religious conviction 
causes him to feature a cheerful disposition would seem inhuman.  
Similarly, Sen concludes that the desire approach to the assessment of 
well-being “can take a deeply biased form” (1984a, p. 512). Living in an 
impoverished environment or working under slavish conditions causes 
people to lose “the courage to desire a better deal” (ibid.). By that Sen 
seems to be saying that people cannot desire something they do not know 
about. If they have never come to enjoy affluence, they will generically 
have low aspirations. This does not, however, imply that they would not 
value other states of being. Furthermore, desire and well-being may not 
always work in the same direction. Sen (1985, p. 189-190) argues that 
desiring is a consequence of valuing and that people may value things other 
than well-being, for example, their freedom to achieve their agency goals—
a fundamentally important aspect of the CA which will be scrutinized later. 
Thus, if we want to move beyond the subjectivist view of well-being in 
terms of some mental-state metric of utility and reject commodity fetishism 
of income-based approaches, we have to focus on some more objective 
criteria, such as a person’s functionings—the “doings” and “beings” that he 
or she manages to achieve. This does not rule out the value of being happy 
since “the ability to achieve happiness … can certainly be seen as one of 
many [functionings]” (Sen, 1984a, p. 513) as it is indisputable an element 
of a good life. The claim that functionings adequately reflect well-being 
“builds on the straightforward fact that how well a person is must be a 
matter of what kind of life he or she is living and what the person is 
succeeding in “doing” and “being”” (Sen, 2010, p. 19). Functionings are 
thus intrinsically valuable. The evaluative space restricted to utility 
information in traditional welfare economics, liberties and rights in  
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libertarian approaches and primary social goods in Rawlsian justice is now 
significantly broadened to a plurality of focal variables in the form of 
functionings. Throughout his academic career, Sen has continuously 
emphasized the importance of capturing the diversity of elements which 
make up a valuable life. This is succinctly brought out in Development as 
Freedom (1999a, p. 77): 
“To insist that there should be only one homogeneous magnitude 
that we value is to reduce drastically the range of our evaluative 
reasoning. It is not, for example, to the credit of classical 
utilitarianism that it values only pleasure without taking any direct 
interest in freedom, rights, creativity or actual living conditions. To 
insist on the mechanical comfort of having just homogenous “good 
thing” would be too deny out humanity as reasoning creatures.”  
3.1.4   Capability and Freedom 
Though we have noted that the subtle idea of freedom and opportunity in 
the writings of Rawls inspired Sen in the development of his “basic 
capability equality,” we have not yet established its linkage to well-being.  
Being well-nourished, participating in elections, attending school or 
appearing in public without shame are defined as functionings. Functioning 
vectors (also referred to as functioning n-tuples) describe combinations of 
various doings and beings that a person can achieve. The various 
functioning vectors within a person’s reach make up for his or her 
capability set (Sen, 1985, pp. 200-201). Sen (1992, p. 40) suggests that the 
capability set can also be thought of as a budget constraint. While the 
budget set, a term employed in microeconomics, represents all possible 
combinations of goods the person is free to choose from given the prices 
and the person’s income, the capability set describes a person’s freedom to  
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choose from possible lifestyles. Why should we be concerned with 
capability in the analysis of well-being as we have concluded that a 
person’s well-being is made up of achieved functionings? This is a 
reasonable objection which has even aroused confusion among scientists.  
Cohen (1993) appreciates Sen’s approach to measure “something falling 
between primary social goods and utility,” (ibid., p. 18) but cannot accept 
“capability to have an athletic character” (ibid., p. 24). By that he means 
that the CA invariably prerequisites choice to obtain the benefits of goods. 
For him, “goods cause further desirable states directly, without any 
exercise of capability on the part of their beneficiary” (ibid., p. 18). He 
therefore contends that the focus of the evaluative exercise should be on 
what he calls “midfare” which “is constituted of states of the person 
produced by goods, states in virtue of which utility levels take the values 
they do” (ibid.).  
Babies—to use one of his examples—cannot choose to be fed or to be 
clothed. Their parents must take care of that. Thus despite their inability to 
make choices, they nevertheless succeed in achieving valuable doings and 
beings. As Sen himself notes, Cohen’s midfare then corresponds to what he 
has called functionings (1993, p. 43). Sen has always stressed that in some 
cases an assessment of a person’s achieved functionings is indeed more 
appropriate than being concerned with his or her capability to function. 
Infants, children or mentally handicapped people may not be able to make 
complex choices suggesting that we should be concerned with their 
achieved functionings rather than with their capability. Similarly, the word 
“basic” in the term “basic capabilities” implies that focusing on a person’s  
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capability is needless as long as these basic necessities are not met 
(Robeyns, 2005, p. 101).
20  
Nevertheless, Sen contends that our primary focus should be on capability 
rather than on functionings or midfare because the capability set includes 
valuable information on a person’s freedom (Sen, 1985, pp. 201-202). 
Freedom matters for two reasons.  
First, as argued earlier, Sen rejects the self-interest motive of traditional 
welfare economics and instead assumes that people may pursue goals other 
than material well-being. When judging a person’s well-being it can be 
therefore crucial to check whether compared with other people this person 
could have achieved all relevant functioning vectors that the others could. 
If this is found to be true, then it can be inferred that the respective person 
had the freedom to live well but decided against it. Sen calls the idea of the 
freedom to achieve well-being—quite intuitively—well-being freedom. 
The differentiation of the well-being aspect into achieved well-being and 
well-being freedom set forth in Sen (1985) is to be seen as an essential 
advancement of the CA.
21  
In order to back up his assertion with some anecdotal evidence, Sen alleges 
the fasting versus starving example in almost all of his writings on the CA 
subsequent to his 1984 Dewey Lectures (1985). In this example Sen 
                                                       
20 Note that the achieved functioning (chosen element) is invariably part of the 
capability set. The measurement of capability can thus always be employed in the 
analysis of well-being. It is however important to clarify initially which information is 
needed for proper assessment. If only achieved functionings are to be assessed then 
determining capability with its demanding informational requirement becomes 
redundant.   
21 Sen (2010) employs the differentiation between “well-being” and “advantage” to 
refer to the same thing.  
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considers a rich person who consciously decides to starve due to his 
religious fasting ritual and an indigent person who is deprived of the means 
to command food and is therefore forced to starve. In terms of their well-
being achievement they are identical as both of them suffer from being 
undernourished. However, the rich person starves out of conviction while 
the poor is genuinely left with no choice. Concluding that they are identical 
in terms of well-being would therefore seem wrong-headed. The appraisal 
of well-being clearly depends on the assessment of how the adopted 
functioning has come about (Sen, 1992, p. 52). We thus need to be 
concerned with a person’s capability to function.  
Second, in the light of standard microeconomic consumer theory it would 
not be considered a loss if all elements of a capability set, except the 
chosen functioning vector, were eliminated because the favorite alternative 
would still be available. However, it may be argued that being able to 
choose makes a difference. This invokes the question of how we can take 
account of the value of freedom to choose.  
Sen (1985, p. 43) suggests that one way of dealing with this problem would 
be to make elementary evaluation—the identification of the value of the 
capability set with the value of the chosen or the maximum element— and 
to take note of the extent of choices. However, taking the number of 
functioning vectors as a representation of the extent of choice would 
overlook that having too many choices may be more of a burden than a 
benefit and that the quality of the alternative obviously must also matter.  
If, however, the freedom to choose is to have intrinsic value, then from a 
theoretical point of view freedom would need to constitute one of the 
dimensions of well-being. Sen thus concludes that choosing should be 
incorporated as one tuple in each functioning n-tuple. If we control for 
substantive freedom of choice then elementary evaluation may, after all, be  
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a viable way of dealing with the evaluation of the capability set. This is 
supported by the fact that “the good life is partly a life of genuine choice” 
(Sen, 2010, p. 45). Though this way of dealing with the problem seems 
reasonable, it does not resolve the fundamental problem of how to value 
freedom of choice. Sen never manages to clarify this issue.  
3.1.5   Selection and Weighting 
In describing the evolution of the CA, one fundamental aspect has been 
omitted so far: The issue of evaluation. Sen himself asserts that “there is no 
escape from the problem of evaluation” (1992, p. 44). While Sen (1980, p. 
219) contents himself with outlining that the relative weights of different 
capabilities must be “culture-dependent”, he extensively discusses the issue 
of valuation of functionings and the interpersonal comparability of well-
being, first in Commodities and Capabilities (2010) and also in his later 
works. Our impression is that his rationale has changed little. At the risk of 
oversimplification, it may be said that Sen basically suggests a three-step 
procedure for the evaluation of well-being.  
First, the functionings relating to “the underlying concerns and values” of 
the people have to be identified (Sen, 1992, p. 44). Because of varying 
cultural, social, economic and environmental circumstances Sen leaves the 
list of intrinsically valuable functionings deliberately open-ended and 
distances himself from efforts of other scholars to endorse a fully specified 
list.
22 In some cases it might be fairly easy to conclude a list of centrally 
important functionings. If, for example, we are in the context of 
development, confining our focus to basic capabilities may seem plausible. 
Moving to more affluent societies may require us to take note of more 
complex functionings such as appearing in public without shame or work-
                                                       
22 We shall discuss this issue at some length in section four.   
 
27
life balance. Thus, the CA takes note of human diversity in a twofold way: 
First, in the absence of a list, human beings may decide which functionings 
are relevant for their lives. Second, since the object of value is a person’s 
achieved functioning or his or her capability to function, the evaluation 
exercise takes account of the varying conversion characteristics in a way 
opulence-based approaches do not. This is important because it considers 
that “we are diverse, but diverse in different ways” (Sen, 1990, p. 120). 
The second step takes the form of attaching weights to the respective 
functionings. Sen emphasizes that the functionings of the selected space are 
not equally valuable. Some functionings are certainly more urgent than 
others and are thus weighted differently. The question of how the weights 
are selected is quite crucial in this context. One may be tempted to think 
that the value attached to a functioning corresponds to the gain of utility 
from that state. This is not the case. While utility is a mental state metric, 
the individual valuation of functionings is a reflexive exercise. In this 
context, Sugden rightly points out that “the value of functionings is a 
matter of intrinsic value, and not of individual preference or choice” (1993, 
p. 1953).  
This evaluation does not necessarily need to generate complete orderings. 
An individual may be able to rank A before B and C but be undecided 
whether State B or C offers a better lifestyle. Moving from the individual to 
the aggregate level, it is important to note that social evaluation does not 
require coincidence of individual valuations. Indeed the CA avoids Arrow-
type impossibility despite varying relative weights. The intersection of 
conflicting views will give rise to a range of weights on which the members 
of society agree. From Sen’s point of view, this partial ordering is not an 
embarrassment because social evaluation does not have to be an “all-or-
nothing-exercise” (1992, p. 48). Having agreement on some parts is  
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certainly better than no agreement at all. In Development as Freedom, Sen 
expresses his optimism about functioning democracies, noting that the 
range of weights, which reflects the degree of agreement on the relative 
value of functionings, can be narrowed through “public discussion and 
democratic understanding and acceptance” (1999a, pp. 78-79).  
While one may cast doubt on the practicability of weighting functionings 
according to this procedure, further complications arise when we move 
from valuing functionings to valuing capability sets. Sugden (1993, p. 
1953) stresses that elementary evaluation is inconsistent with Sen’s theory 
because if the valuation of functionings is a reflexive exercise, “it seems 
that the same should apply to the valuation of capabilities, so that we 
should not distinguish any element of the capability set in virtue of its 
being most preferred by, or chosen by, the person concerned”. It is, 
however, consistent to distinguish the most valuable functioning vector of 
the set and identify the value of the set with the value of this vector. 
Although this would offer a viable solution of the problem, Sen never 
comments on it.  
Third, having specified the selection and the weighting process we still 
encounter the question of which data sources ought to be used to measure 
functionings and capability sets. Sen says disappointingly little about this 
issue. Only in Commodities and Capabilities does he devote a chapter to 
the description of the procedure (2010, pp. 26-32). He contends that 
depending on the nature of the exercise, one has to decide which data 
sources are best suited. While in developing countries we may be able to 
obtain valuable information on people’s functionings from direct 
observation (e.g. morbidity, nourishment, longevity), more sophisticated 
functionings may call for creativity in combining different sources. In some 
cases questionnaires will yield the best results. In other contexts we may  
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even make use of market purchase data for approximation. Sometimes the 
theoretical requirements are too demanding, and practical compromises 
have to be made. In this context, Sen emphasizes that “clarity of theory has 
to be combined with the practical need to make do with whatever 
information we can feasibly obtain for our actual empirical analyses” (ibid., 
p. 32).  
3.2  The Agency Aspect of the Capability Approach 
If Sen had taken on the assumption of traditional welfare economics of 
assessing the good in terms of personal well-being, then instead of viewing 
man as a rational utility maximizer, the CA would assume man to 
maximize his achieved functionings. In the previous section we outlined 
Sen’s distinction between well-being and well-being freedom. If man were 
only concerned with the pursuit of his well-being, this distinction would 
seem artificial and redundant. Since Sen assumes that individuals do not 
make any mistakes in their choices (1985, p. 203), there would be no 
reason to be concerned with well-being freedom as man would naturally 
choose the functioning which maximizes his own well-being. If Sen, 
however, draws this distinction, then he must suppose that human actions 
may sometimes be driven by motives other than personal well-being.
23 This 
idea is captured by the agency aspect to whose theoretical evolution we 
shall turn now. In contrast to Prendergast (2005, p. 1151) who argues that 
Sen was first concerned with finding an informational base for a more 
constructive welfare economics and then drew attention to agency related 
issues, we believe that the two aspects evolved simultaneously and were 
conflated in the Dewey Lectures (1985).  
                                                       
23 For further discussion of this issue, see Sen (1987b, p. 41).   
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3.2.1  The Evolution of the Agency Aspect 
In his essay “Utilitarianism and Welfarism” (1979b), Sen is particularly 
concerned with the two constituents of traditional welfare economics: 
consequentialism and welfarism. Consequentialism or outcome morality is 
concerned with the judgment of states of affairs. However, it does not 
specify the measure in which outcomes are to be assessed. Thus, unless 
combined with the notion of welfarism, which rules out any information 
other than utility and thus confines the role of rights and liberties to a 
purely instrumental one, consequence-based analysis can in fact 
incorporate the “realization and failure of rights” (Sen, 1982, pp. 5-6) in the 
assessment of outcomes.  
Since constraint-based libertarianism attaches equal weight to all rights and 
liberties, it rules out the possibility of trading off the “badness” of different 
rights violations. It is this very notion to which Sen is opposed. In his 
opinion there is no reason why, for instance, the possibility of saving 
human lives should not justify the violation of property rights (1984b, p. 
312).  
Rights in the libertarian view take the form of negative freedoms, that is, “it 
binds others negatively … but they are under no obligation to help me to 
exercise these rights” (ibid., p. 313). Sen takes the view that a state in 
which a person does not take advantage of the opportunity to stop the 
violation of someone else’s negative freedom is to be distinguished from a 
situation in which that person in fact prevents this injustice. Note that non-
consequential libertarianism would, however, not make this distinction.  
In his “Rights and Agency” (1982), Sen tackles this issue. First, he adopts 
the perspective of viewing rights in terms of capabilities, which comes 
close to the notion of positive freedom and not in terms of negative 
freedoms. Rights are normally defined as a relation between two persons.  
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Capabilities are in this context to be seen as a relation between a person 
and states of doing or being. Next, he introduces the concept of “goal rights 
systems”. These are systems “in which fulfilment and nonrealization of 
rights are included among the goals, incorporated in the evaluation of state 
of affairs, and then applied to the choice of actions through consequential 
links” (ibid., p. 15).  
What may at first sound quite complicated is actually quite easy. If rights 
are taken as capabilities (which we know have intrinsic value), then the 
“realization or failure” (ibid., pp. 5-6) of these capabilities has to make a 
difference in the evaluation of states of affairs. From the previous section 
we know that capabilities are weighted differently. If one capability is 
valued more than another and the more valuable one could be attained only 
if the less valuable were violated, then actions would need to be chosen 
which would bring about this outcome.  
Recall the case outlined in section 2.3. The murder of A by B can only be 
prevented if C steals B’s car. If murder is considered a more severe 
violation of someone’s right than theft, then the latter will be justified to 
prevent the former. This applies irrespective of whether rights are defined 
in terms of negative freedom or in terms of capability.  But now imagine 
A’s life were in danger despite immunity from interference of B or any 
other person and C were nevertheless in the position to save A’s life. In this 
case negative freedom would not require C to commit to A’s savior. If we, 
however, define rights in terms of capability then A’s life has intrinsic 
value and C’s intervention becomes necessary.  
3.2.2  The Significance of the Agency Aspect 
Showing responsibility and commitment in this case is what Sen (1985) 
generally refers to as the “agency aspect” of freedom. Sen’s writings make  
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clear that meeting one’s obligations as a moral agent may also entail 
sacrificing personal well-being. Agency freedom is, however, not limited to 
taking note of a person’s allegiances and obligations. More broadly 
defined, the agency aspect relates to “what the person is free to do and 
achieve in pursuit of whatever goals or values he or she regards as 
important” (ibid, p. 203).
24 Thus, it may be claimed that if personal well-
being is thought of as an important value, then the agency aspect can 
simply subsume the formerly discussed well-being aspect. Sen has rejected 
this notion from the very beginning. To him a clear distinction between 
well-being achievement, well-being freedom, agency achievement, agency 
freedom and the standard of living (a narrower evaluative exercise of well-
being achievement introduced in Sen (1987a))
25 is indispensible because 
the aspects can be different in magnitude and direction.  
The pursuit of one’s agency goals, for instance, may compel one to give up 
personal well-being. For example, the fasting person foregoes his material 
well-being in favor of his cherished agency goal (religious conviction), but 
                                                       
24 Sen (1985, p. 204) notes that the agency aspect applies only to responsible agents 
since children or mentally handicapped people cannot make well-informed decisions or 
pursue reasonable goals, thus making their well-being achievement the central concern 
of the evaluative exercise.  
25 While the evaluation of one’s agency aspect is a broader exercise than the assessment 
of one’s well-being and transcends an analysis in terms of functionings, measuring 
one’s standard of living is considered a narrower evaluative exercise in terms of 
functionings than the appraisal of one’s well-being. Sen (1987a, pp. 35-39) explains that 
in contrast to personal well-being, the standard of living rules out all influences on well-
being that are not related to “one’s own life”. For instance, things done out of 
“sympathy” such as helping an old lady cross the street may make one feel better but do 




because he is rich he had the opportunity to achieve well-being. His well-
being freedom—his ability to achieve well-being—thus remains 
unaffected. Failing as a moral agent, on the other hand, may reduce one’s 
well-being freedom due to bad conscience. It is also possible that being 
frustrated about not accomplishing one’s agency goals negatively affects 
one’s well-being achievement, too. Sen (1985, p. 207) therefore 
emphasizes: 
“The ranking of alternative opportunities from the point of view of 
agency need not be the same as the ranking in terms of well-being, 
and thus the judgments of agency freedom and well-being can 
move in contrary directions. So, even though agency freedom is 
“broader” than well-being, the former cannot subsume the latter.”  
The clear distinction between these constitutive elements is also important 
for public policy. Sen (1992, pp. 69-72) explains that society may assume 
responsibility for a person’s well-being to some extent but does not equally 
have to be concerned with the promotion of the person’s other agency 
goals. The assessment of the well-being is thus more relevant to public 
policy.
26 
3.2.3  Plurality in the Notion of Freedom 
In this section we shall once more return to the notion of freedom in Sen’s 
writings. While we characterized well-being freedom as the ability to 
achieve well-being, agency freedom describes a person’s ability to bring 
about the achievements one has reason to value in a broader sense.  Sen 
(1985, pp. 208-212) suggests two ways in which agents can bring about the 
valuable achievements, both in the narrower well-being sense and the 
                                                       
26 Given the interdependence between agency achievement and well-being achievement, 
the agency aspect should however not be totally ignored by public officials.   
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broader agency notion. Particularly, he distinguishes between the “effective 
power” and the “procedural control” element of freedom. The former refers 
to “our ability to get what we value and want, without the levers of control 
being directly operated by us” (1992, p. 64). In this case it may be possible 
that we get what we value precisely because that is what we would have 
chosen. Sen refers to this phenomenon as “counterfactual choice”. For 
instance, we may choose to move about safely and, because state 
authorities know this, they provide public goods in the form of security 
services. In this way, we achieve our freedom to move about safely without 
having direct control over this freedom ourselves.  
On the contrary a person’s freedom may be assessed in terms of the 
person’s ability to exercise control over the process of choice. The outcome 
is, however, left open in this perspective. Although Sen concedes that in 
some cases “it may not be adequate just to get what one would have chose 
… [and] one must actually do the choosing oneself” (1985, p. 212), he 
contends that “given the complex nature of social organization, it is often 
hard, if not impossible, to have a system that gives each person all the 
levers of control over her own life” (1992, p. 65). Erecting educational 
facilities to enjoy the freedom of being educated, providing social security 
to have the opportunity of being safe or establishing a functioning traffic 
system to be able to move about may well go beyond the scope of our 
capacities.  
But since agency information is part of states of affairs, the ability to 
achieve particular states through one’s own efforts needs to be included in 
the assessment of outcomes. Thus, Sen suggests broadening the view of 
power and attaching importance to control in the appraisal of states of 
affairs. Prendergast (2005, p. 1152) rightly notes that this suggestion 
basically reflects Sen’s earlier proposal that the importance of freedom of  
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choice can be incorporated as an element of the functioning vector. 
However, just as Sen has never elaborated on the valuation of freedom of 
choice, he has neither specified the value of control. This suggests the 
assumption that despite his emphasis that both outcomes and processes 
matter, he attributes more importance to outcome-based consequentialism 
than to rights-based deontology. 
In Sen’s subsequent writings, the original terms “effective power” and 
“procedural control” were subject to some terminological changes. In 
Inequality Reexamined (1992), he refers to them as “effective freedom” and 
“control” and in his latest version set forth in Development as Freedom 
(1999a), he distinguishes between the “opportunity” and the “process” 
aspect to describe essentially the same phenomenon. In the latter one, Sen 
(ibid., pp. 40-41) stresses the interdependent effects between different 
freedoms. For example, freedom from hunger is an achievement which also 
allows a person to work. This occupation, in turn, generates an income 
which that person can use to be housed.  
4  Empirical Application of the Capability Approach 
Although the CA features several tensions, we shall confine our criticism to 
the empirical application of Sen’s approach. The evaluation scheme 
introduced in section 3.1.4 has most notably been challenged by Sugden in 
his review of Inequality Reexamined. He casts doubt on the practicability 
of the CA, “given the rich array of functionings that Sen takes to be 
relevant” and “the extent of disagreement among reasonable people about 
the nature of the good life” (1993, p. 1953). In other words he is skeptical 
about Sen’s refusal to endorse a list of centrally valuable functionings and 
faults the difficulty of deriving adequate weights. While addressing these 
issues certainly requires making reference to some recent studies, it is not  
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our intention to provide a detailed review of the latest methodological 
advancements, nor to discuss empirical results.  
On the one hand, Sen emphasizes the importance of certain functionings 
and capabilities, such as being nourished, educated and sheltered, being 
able to appear in public without shame and being able to move about 
without fear. On the other hand, he has objected the idea of endorsing a 
universally applicable list of functionings and capabilities. In his brief 
essay “Capabilities, Lists and Public Reason: Continuing the Conversation” 
(2004, p. 77), Sen explains “that the problem is not with listing important 
capabilities, but with insisting on one predetermined canonical list of 
capabilities, chosen by theorists without any general social discussion or 
public reasoning. To have such a fixed list, emanating entirely from pure 
theory, is to deny the possibility of fruitful public participation on what 
should be included and why.”  
Sen’s reluctance to propose a specific list has most notably been criticized 
by the well-known and influential philosopher, Martha Nussbaum. Though 
supporting Sen’s idea of arguing for functionings and capabilities, she has 
developed a list of ten capabilities that every society must guarantee to all 
his citizens. Otherwise she says it “falls short of being a fully just society, 
whatever its level of opulence” (2003, p. 40).
27 In her opinion, Sen 
overemphasizes the notion of freedom as the overall social good. She is 
concerned that the freedom enjoyed by one party may conflict with the 
freedom of others. One’s freedom to pollute the environment may conflict 
with someone else’s freedom to enjoy fresh air. Thus, she argues, we need 
a list of capabilities which rules out the use of “bad” freedoms. Her list is 
                                                       
27 Nussbaum (2003, pp. 41-42) lists the following capabilities: (1) life; (2) bodily health; 
(3) bodily integrity; (4) senses, imagination and thought; (5) emotions; (6) practical 
reason; (7) affiliation; (8) other species; (9) play; (10) control over one’s environment.  
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deliberately open-ended so as to allow for ongoing revision. The endorsed 
capabilities are formulated in a way that leaves room for cultural 
specifications. She has also stressed that a list must include also capabilities 
and not just functionings. Being able to participate in political elections is 
certainly not the same as being forced to vote.  
Most researchers make use of Nussbaum’s list in their empirical 
investigations (e.g., Anand et al., 2005) or make a selection of functionings 
and capabilities in accordance with their own values and convictions. 
Martinetti (2000, p. 15), for example, chooses five central functionings 
(housing, health, education and knowledge, social interactions and 
psychological conditions) for her analysis of well-being in Italy. Other 
scholars, such as Robeyns (2003), have suggested a procedural approach 
for the selection of relevant functionings and capabilities by proposing a set 
of criteria. The participatory approach taken by Clark (2005) seems to 
come closest to the methodological procedure Sen has in mind when he 
says “it is the people directly involved who must have the opportunity to 
participate in deciding what should be chosen” (Sen, 1999a, p. 31). Clark’s 
fieldwork undertaken in a South African rural village and urban township 
draws attention directly to the values and aspirations of the poor.  
None of the above-mentioned selection procedures, however, allows for the 
derivation of relative weights. The issue of weighting that Sen seeks to 
solve through the democratic process has indeed been subject to forceful 
criticism. Sugden (1993) and Srinivasan (1994), for example, share the 
opinion that Sen’s argument that the varying importance of different 
capabilities and functionings in the capability framework is as little an 
embarrassment as the varying value of commodities in the real-income 
framework (1992, pp. 45-46) is not compelling. In contrast to the capability 
framework, “the real-income framework includes an operational metric for  
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weighing commodities—the metric of exchange value” (Sugden, 1993, p. 
1954). Respectively, Srinivasan (1994, p. 240) claims that “the only 
conceptually appropriate metrics for valuing functionings and capabilities 
have to be personalized prices or values, namely sets of values that are 
specific to the situation, location, time, and state of nature”. Given the 
interpersonal variation in valuing capabilities and functionings, it seems 
indeed questionable whether such a neat metric can be developed for the 
capability framework. In his response to Sugden and Srinivasan, Sen 
(1999a, pp. 79-81) does not make any effort to convince them of the 
contrary, but does forcefully criticize the significance of the exchange 
value.  
In traditional welfare economics, utility is derived from goods only. Supply 
and demand establish the relative prices of the goods sold in the 
marketplace. According to their preferences and their budget, utility-
maximizing individuals choose which commodities they want to command. 
Since all individuals are assumed to have the same capacity of satisfaction, 
utility measures expressed by the exchange value of commodity bundles 
are made interpersonally comparable. Sen, however, questions the 
assumption that individuals have the same ability to reach content, thus 
disallowing for interpersonal comparison of utility levels based on choice 
behavior.  
“There is nothing in the methodology of demand analysis, 
including the theory of revealed preference, that permits any 
reading of interpersonal comparisons of utilities or welfares from 
observed choices of commodity holdings, and thus from real-
income comparisons” (1999a, p. 80). 
Thus the metric of exchange value of the real-income framework is neither 
useful for interpersonal comparisons of utility, nor for interpersonal  
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comparisons of well-being achievements, since the transformation of 
commodities into functionings is, as argued above, dependent on individual 
conversion characteristics. In this way, Sen conclusively rejects the merit 
of the real-income framework suggested by Sugden and Srinivasan. 
However, by pointing out the inadequacy of the metric of exchange value, 
Sen does not facilitate the selection and weighting procedure of the CA. 
Without an established measurement scale for functionings and a generally 
accepted weighting scheme, any empirical investigation must become 
seriously challenging. In fact, Anand et al. (2005, p.14) note “that such 
difficulties have contributed to the relative dearth of empirical applications 
up to now.”  
One method of dealing with the issue has been scaling. Scaling, the 
projection of variables into a 0-1 range, was employed in the Human 
Development Index (HDI), an alternative index to the GDP (Gross 
Domestic Product) per capita.
28 The advantage of scaling in this case is that 
international comparisons become indeed possible. But what are the 
relative weights of the three variables incorporated in the index? The 
constructors of the HDI treat all three variables are weighted equally. 
“There is however no reason why … weights should reflect the researcher’s 
values or the individual’s subjective valuation of different variables” 
(Kuklys & Robeyns, 2005, p. 22). Thus, the issue remains unresolved. 
                                                       
28 The index is composed of three central variables – life expectancy, literacy, and real 
GDP per capita. In a cross-country section, the maximum, the minimum and the 
country’s actual value is determined for each of the three variables. The quotient of the 
difference between the maximum and the country’s actual value, and the difference 
between the maximum and the minimum value indicates the country’s deprivation index 
for the chosen variables. By taking a simple average of all three deprivation indexes and 




A different method is employed by Anand et al. (2005). Their approach 
seems to be advantageous for two reasons. First, while most empirical 
contributions have been limited to the analysis of the relation between 
functionings and well-being because secondary data sets rarely include 
information on people’s capabilities, Anand et al. are among the few 
scholars who have managed to provide a first tentative investigation of the 
impact of capabilities on well-being.  
Second, the authors seem to evade the weighting issue by taking the 
individuals’ overall life satisfaction as a subjective measure of well-being. 
They then examine the effects of various variables such as health, housing, 
recreation, nourishment, job, etc., on well-being. Because they 
acknowledge that overall life satisfaction may be biased by personality 
traits such as “a tendency to always look on the bright side” (ibid., p. 17), 
they use proxies for unobserved personality traits by measures of 
satisfaction in particular areas of life. Thus they ensure that only 
capabilities have an influence on the respondents’ satisfaction level enjoyed 
in the different areas of life. Using this methodology they are able to show 
that, on the one hand, capabilities have an impact on well-being measured 
in overall life satisfaction and, on the other hand, functionings and 
capabilities affect well-being differently, thus making it possible to derive a 
unique set of weights. However, it is questionable whether self-reported 
satisfaction measures, even if controlled for personality traits, are an 
adequate reflection of well-being.  
The critical review outlined in this section shows that progress needs to be 
made to produce more meaningful empirical results. The current empirical 
shortcomings should not, however, lead to questioning the significance of 
the CA. In his response to Sugden’s criticism, Atkinson (1998, pp. 185-
186) said that “there is more than one way in which an idea of this kind can  
 
41
be operationally effective … A concept is effective if it causes people to 
think in a different way, and this applies to analytical models as well as to 
quantification.” In this context, Pressman and Summerfield (2000, pp. 98-
102) provide an appreciation of the revolutionary impact of Sen’s 
pioneering work on the development paradigm. Thanks to Sen’s tireless 
efforts to consider variables apart from income for the measurement of 
human well-being, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
has published the Human Development Report annually since 1990. This 
report includes the previously mentioned HDI.
29 Sen’s influence becomes 
clearly evident in the introduction of the report’s first issue:  
“This Report is about people - and about how development 
enlarges their choices. It is about more than GNP growth, more 
than income and wealth and more than producing commodities and 
accumulating capital. A person's access to income may be one of 
the choices, but it is not the sum total of human endeavour” 
(UNDP, 1990, p. 1). 
While the shift from seeing development as economic growth to seeing it 
as capability expansion is certainly the greatest merit of Sen’s theorizing, 
other achievements must not be underestimated. To name only a few, his 
research on famines and hunger (most notably the Bengal famine in 1943) 
has demonstrated that famines are closely linked to the distribution of food 
entitlements and not to output shortage as customarily assumed.
30 
Similarly, his studies on gender-related issues have shown that 
development goals may be better accomplished if projects concentrate on 
the empowerment of women. In areas where gender discrimination is a 
                                                       
29 It is not my intention to discuss the pros and cons of the HDI at this point. For further 
reading, see UNDP (1990).  
30 For further discussion of famines and their prevention, see Sen (1999a, pp. 160-188).  
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serious issue, feeding programs prove more successful if they focus on the 
nutrition of women and girls rather than on food disbursements to the 
respective households; this is because resources tend be unjustly distributed 
among family members. Sen has also stressed that projects focusing on 
women help to reduce fertility rates and child mortality.
31  
5  Concluding Remarks  
This paper provides evidence that similar to Newton’s discovery of gravity, 
Sen’s CA has been built “on the shoulder of giants”. Many years of 
investigating, disputing and learning from traditional philosophical 
approaches preceded Sen’s primordial “basic capability equality” (1980) 
and his first comprehensive articulation of the CA in his 1984 Dewey 
Lectures (1985). His idea of judging human advantage in terms of 
functionings and capabilities sounds simple, but is the result of a long 
quest.  
The nihilistic foundations of standard welfare economics he encountered 
when studying social choice theory at the outset of his academic career 
made him realize that the informational base of an adequate theory of the 
social good would need to take account of distributional issues and the 
proper treatment of rights by considering non-utility information. However, 
as he appreciated the consequence-sensitivity of classical utilitarianism in 
general and standard welfare economics in particular, Nozick’s rights-
based approach did not represent a serious alternative. Rawls’ freedom-
oriented conception of primary social goods inspired him to scrutinize 
well-being from the standpoint of the individual. Though Sen appreciated 
Rawls’ notion of freedom, he objected the latter’s suggestion to judge 
individual advantage in terms of primary social goods because 
                                                       
31 For further discussion of gender related issues, see Sen (1999a, pp. 189-204).  
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interpersonally varying conversion characteristics govern the 
transformation from goods into freedoms. Thus, if we are seriously 
interested in the freedoms people enjoy, we should look at their 
achievements and their ability to achieve, rather than solely their means to 
achieve. Neither should we limit our focus to utility measures because 
being happy or pleased is only one aspect of a good life. Sen felt that the 
assessment of the individual good should be based on achieved 
functionings and the capability to function.  
A person’s capability matters for two reasons. First, it takes note of the 
value of being able to choose. Second, it acknowledges that people may 
pursue goals other than material well-being. The latter idea is brought out 
by the agency aspect of the CA: obligations, allegiances and values may all 
be reasons to forego personal well-being. On the contrary, the joy 
generated through the accomplishment of one’s agency goals may have a 
positive effect on one’s well-being. Taking note of the interdependent 
effects between the different dimensions is a central exercise of the CA.  
In our view the CA underwent only minor changes subsequent to the 
Dewey Lectures (1985). For example, Sen (1987a) introduced the 
distinction between the well-being aspect and the standard of living. 
Furthermore, Development as Freedom (1999a), his latest work considered 
in this analysis, shows that Sen has advanced his concept of freedom in the 
course of the years.  
The empirical application of the CA has caused difficulties. Which 
functionings and capabilities are relevant? Should the selection be context-
dependent or should we employ a fully specified list irrespective of the 
context? What is the relative value of different functionings and 
capabilities? Is there a way to derive weights or do researchers have to 
specify them according to their own values? These unresolved issues call  
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for further research. This should not, however, lead to questioning the 
significance of the CA. Empirical validity is one thing and the impact of a 
theory on people’s way of thinking is another. The Human Development 
Report is only one of many examples of the impact of Sen’s important 







Anand, P. & Hunter, G. & Smith, R. (2005): “Capabilities and Well-being: 
Evidence based on the Sen-Nussbaum Approach to Welfare”, in: Social 
Indicators Research, 74 (1), pp. 9-55.  
Atkinson, A. B. (1998): “The Contributions of Amartya Sen to Welfare 
Economics”, in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 101 (2), pp. 
173-190. 
Arrow, K. (1951): Social Choice and Individual Values, New York: Wiley.   
Arrow, K. J. (1999): “Amartya K. Sen’s Contributions to the Study of 
Social Welfare”, in: The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Vol. 101, 
No. 2, pp. 163-172.  
Bentham, J. (1789 (1982)): An Introduction to the Principles of Morales 
and Legislation, London: Methuen & Co. Ltd.   
Clark, D. A. (2005): “Sen’s Capability Approach and the Many Spaces of 
Human Well-being”, in: The Journal of Development Studies, 41 (8), pp. 
1339-1368.  
Cohen, G. A. (1993): “Equality of What? On Welfare, Goods, and 
Capabilities”, in: M. Nussbaum & A. K. Sen (eds.), The Quality of Life, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Garis, D. (2007): Manna from Heaven, Oxford: Georg Ronald.  
 
45
Keynes, J. M. (1930 (1963)): Essays in Persuasion, New York: W. W. 
Norton & Co. 
Klamer, A. (1989): “A Conversation with Amartya Sen”, in: Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 3 (1), pp. 135-150. 
Kuklys, W. & Robeyns, I. (2005): “Sen’s Capability Approach to Welfare 
Economics”, in: Kuklys, W. (ed.), Amartya Sen’s Capability Approach – 
Theoretical Insights and Empirical Applications, Berlin: Springer.  
Little (1950): A Critique of Welfare Economics, 2
nd edition, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Martinetti, E. C. (2000): “A Multidimensional Assessment of Well-being 
based on Sen’s Functioning Approach”, in: Rivista Internazionale di 
Scienza Sociali, 108 (2), pp. 207-239.  
Nozick, R. (1974): Anarchy, State and Utopia, Oxford: Blackwelll. 
Nussbaum, M. (2003): “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and 
Social Justice”, in: Feminist Economics, 9 (2-3), pp. 33-59. 
Prendergast, R. (2005): “The Concept of Freedom and its Relation to 
Economic Development – a Critical Appreciation of the Work of Amartya 
Sen”, Cambridge Journal of Economics, 29, pp. 1145-1170. 
Pressman, S. & Summerfield, G. (2000): “The Economic Contributions of 
Amartya Sen”, in: Review of Political Economy, 12 (1), pp. 89-113.  
Rawls, J. (1971): A Theory of Justice, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press.  
Robeyns, I. (2003): “Sen’s Capability Approach and Gender Inequality: 
Selecting Relevant Capabilities”, in: Feminist Economics, 9 (2-3), pp. 61-
92.  
Robeyns, I. (2005): “The Capability Approach: a Theoretical Survey”, in: 
Journal of Human Development, 6 (1), pp. 93-114.  
Robbins, L. (1935): The Nature and Significance of Economic Science, 2
nd 
edition, London: Macmillan. 
Sen, A. K. (1970): Collective Choice and Social Welfare, San Francisco: 
Holden-Day, and Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd.  
Sen, A. (1979a): “Personal Utilities and Public Judgements: or What’s 
Wrong with Welfare Economics?”, in: Economic Journal, 89, pp. 537- 
 
46
558, reprinted in A. K. Sen (ed.), Choice, Welfare and Measurement, 
Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1982. 
Sen, A. K. (1979b): “Utilitarianism and Welfarism”, in: The Journal of 
Philosophy, 76 (9), pp. 463-489. 
Sen, A. K. (1980): “Equality of What?”, in: S. McMurrin (ed.), Tanner 
Lectures on Human Values, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1982): “Rights and Agency”, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
11 (1), pp. 3-39. 
Sen, A. K. (1984a): “Goods and People”, in: Resources, Values and 
Development, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1984b): “Rights and Capabilities”, in: Resources, Values and 
Development, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1985): “Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey 
Lectures 1984”, in: Journal of Philosophy, 82 (4), pp. 169-221. 
Sen, A. K. (1987a): “The Standard of Living”, in: G. Hawthorn (ed.), The 
Standard of Living, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1987b): On Ethics and Economics, Oxford: Blackwell. 
Sen, A. K. (1990): “Justice: Means versus Freedom”, in: Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, 19 (2), pp. 111-121.  
Sen, A. K. (1992): Inequality Reexamined, Cambridge, Mass: Harvard 
University Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1993): “Capability and Well-being”, in: M. Nussbaum & A. K. 
Sen (Eds.), The Quality of Life, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1997): On Economic Inequality, Expanded Edition with a 
Substantial Annexe by James E. Forster and Amartya Sen, Oxford: 
Calendron Press.  
Sen, A. K. (1999a): Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Sen, A. K. (1999b): “Autobiography”, in: T. Frängsmyr (ed.): Les Prix 





Sen, A. K. (2004): “Capabilities, Lists and Public Reason: Continuing the 
Conversation”, in: Feminist Economics, 10 (3), pp. 77-80. 
Sen, A. K. (2010): Commodities and Capabilities, 14
th edition, Oxford: 
Oxford India Paperbacks. 
Srinivasan, T. N. (1994): Human Development: A New Paradigm or 
Reinvention of the Wheel?, in: American Economic Review, Papers and 
Proceedings, 84 (2), pp. 238-243. 
Streeten et al. (1981): First things first: Meeting basic needs in developing 
countries, New York: Oxford University Press.  
Sugden, R. (1993): “Welfare, Resources and Capabilities: A Review of 
Inequality Reexamined by Amartya Sen”, in: Journal of Economic 
Literature, 31, pp. 1947-1962. 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (1990): Human 
Development Report 1990, New York: Oxford University Press.  